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AND THEN THERE WERE NONE:
REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS AND THE
BUYER WHO DOES NOT BUY
Abstract: In requirements contract cases where buyer has significantly reduced-or
no-requirements, courts employ inconsistent reasoning, resulting in legal uncertainty and
economically inefficient exchanges. This Comment proposes a more predictable, efficient
rule that would allow buyer to reduce its requirements after giving seller a business reason
for the reduction, placing the risk of reduced requirements explicitly on seller.
A car manufacturer agreed to buy all its tires from one tire maker.
Their four-year contract estimated that the manufacturer would need
500,000 tires. But after the tire maker had delivered only 25,000 tires,
oil prices rose drastically and demand for large cars dropped. The man-
ufacturer stopped car production and told the tire maker that it had no
more requirements for tires.
Courts deciding what remedy should be available to a disappointed
seller under a requirements contract have employed inconsistent rea-
soning, rendering contracts more costly. Different courts have empha-
sized various factors to determine if buyer may reduce its
requirements, thus depriving contracting parties of a clear guide to
their rights and obligations under such contracts if reduced require-
ments occur. At the time of contracting, both buyer and seller are
unable to predict what circumstances justify a reduction and are
forced to expend resources bargaining for a more predictable alloca-
tion of the risk of reduced requirements. As a result, the cost of con-
tracting increases, and the value of contracting declines.
This Comment proposes a "business reason" rule that would pro-
vide contracting parties the desired predictability. The rule would
allow buyer to reduce its requirements orders after giving seller a busi-
ness reason for the reduction, allocating the risk of reduced require-
ments explicitly to seller. "Business reason" means an economic
reason, such as business losses or the opportunity to net a higher profit
in an alternative enterprise. At the time of contracting, parties would
know that buyer may reduce its requirements after giving seller a busi-
ness reason. Only parties who prefer a different allocation of the risk of
reduced requirements would bargain for an alternative contract term;
more economically efficient exchanges will result. This Comment
shows that the proposed business reason rule is both legally sound and
economically efficient, thus facilitating exchanges by making them less
costly, preserving valuable court resources, and enhancing the advan-
tages of requirements contracts.
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I. THE LAW OF REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS
A. Requirements Contracts Provide Flexible Agreements
Requirements contracts are unique in that quantity is determined by
buyer's actual requirements for the contract good.' Buyer agrees to
buy all of its requirements of the good from seller during the contract
period. Seller agrees to sell to buyer all of buyer's requirements. For
example, if seller manufactures shoelaces and buyer manufactures
shoes, they might decide to enter into a requirements contract. Buyer
agrees to purchase all of its shoelace requirements from seller, and
seller agrees to sell all the shoelaces buyer requires.
U.C.C. § 2-306(1) governs all requirements contracts for the sale of
goods.2 The Section provides:
(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements
as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably dispro-
portionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to
any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may
be tendered or demanded.
A contract that provides either a stated maximum or minimum quan-
tity that may be demanded, or an estimate of requirements, is within
the definition of a requirements contract.3
Early common law courts held requirements contracts void as illu-
sory and lacking in mutuality because such contracts give buyer broad
discretion in the performance of the contract: buyer may or may not
have any requirements.4 If buyer manufactures only tennis shoes and
a change in the consumer market renders laced tennis shoes obsolete
in favor of shoes with velcro tape, buyer may choose to produce tennis
shoes with velcro tape. As a result, buyer would have no requirements
for shoelaces and would place no orders with seller.
1. An output contract is similar to a requirements contract. In an output contract, quantity is
determined by seller's output of the contract good. Buyer agrees to purchase all of seller's output
for the contract period. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1987) governs both requirements and output
contracts. This Comment does not discuss output contracts. It deals only with the particular
situation where a requirements buyer has substantially reduced-or no-requirements.
2. U.C.C. § 2-306(1), originally promulgated in the 1950's, is the first codification of the law
of requirements contracts. Weistart, Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations
Under the UCC, 1973 DUKE L.J. 599. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia adopted
§ 2-306 as it appears in the Official Code. Louisiana did not adopt Article 2. 2 ANDERSON ON
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306:2 (1982).
3. Note, Requirements Contracts, "More or Less, " Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 109 (1980).
4. E.g., Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (1873) (requirements contract void as lacking in
mutuality because buyer not obligated to "want" or purchase any of the contract good).
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Today, courts and commentators agree that requirements contracts
are valid and enforceable.5 Seller is obligated to provide buyer's actual
requirements. If buyer has requirements, it must purchase those
requirements from that seller. Buyer has obligated itself to exclusive
dealing with seller during the contract period, giving up its freedom to
go into the market and obtain its requirements from the seller of its
choice.6 In addition, whether buyer in fact has any requirements is
not left completely to buyer's whim; the U.C.C. imposes on buyer a
good faith obligation in the performance of the contract.7
A requirements contract offers advantages to both buyer and seller
that a fixed quantity contract generally cannot. A buyer may prefer a
requirements contract for three reasons. First, a requirements con-
tract allows production flexibility by enabling buyer to shift to seller
the risk of demand fluctuations in the market for buyer's final prod-
uct.' Buyer may adjust its orders for the contract good to reflect vari-
ations in demand for the final product. When demand is high, buyer
places large orders with seller; when demand is low, buyer places small
orders with seller.9 Second, a requirements contract offers buyer a
guaranteed supply of the contract item. A guaranteed supply is espe-
cially valuable if the item is either scarce or in high demand. Third, if
the contract is a fixed price contract, buyer shifts to seller the risk of a
price increase in the contract good.10 The advantages of a require-
ments contract exist under a fixed quantity contract only if buyer can
predict accurately its need for the contract item. If the market for
buyer's final product is uncertain, or if the product enjoys only spo-
radic demand, a requirements contract offers flexibility not found in a
fixed quantity contract.
5. See Merlite Land, Sea & Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Inv. Properties, Inc., 426 F.2d 495, 498
(5th Cir. 1970) (mutuality of obligation supplied by reference to supplying the "needs" of the
promisor); see also A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 156 (1963) (promise to purchase
requirements is not illusory and is sufficient consideration for a return promise). -
6. See A. CORBIN, supra note 5, at § 156.
7. U.C.C. § 1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement."
8. Weistart, supra note 2, at 609-10.
9. Under a fixed quantity contract, buyer must speculate about future demand for its final
product and, therefore, the contract item. If buyer overestimates its needs, it will incur increased
inventory and storage costs and possibly resale costs. If buyer underestimates its needs, it must
negotiate for the purchase of additional items, perhaps at a higher price. Whether the new
contract is with the same seller or another one, buyer will incur additional transaction costs. See
id. at 610. Transaction costs include locating a willing seller and negotiating a new contract. See
infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of transaction costs.
10. Weistart, supra note 2, at 615. Buyer assumes the risk of any decrease in the price of the
contract item, as the requirements contract prohibits buyer from purchasing the item from
another seller.
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A seller may prefer a requirements contract for four reasons. First,
the contract ensures a market for seller's product. Specifically, the
contract excludes other sellers from sharing or winning the con-
tracting buyer's business. 1 A guaranteed market is particularly valua-
ble to a new seller in the business, providing an opportunity to
establish name recognition and a reputation for reliability. A new
seller may be willing to assume the risk of fluctuations in the market
for buyer's final product in exchange for these advantages. 2 Second, a
requirements contract enables seller to decrease its selling expenses.
With a guaranteed market for its product, seller may decrease its
investment in marketing and sales and reallocate these resources.
Third, if buyer's needs are reasonably predictable, seller's practical
risk may be small. If buyer has been in its business for many years, or
if seller has worked with buyer for several years, seller may be able to
predict accurately buyer's needs. Seller will be able to schedule its
production and allocate its resources efficiently.13 Fourth, seller may
charge a higher price for its product to compensate for the risk inci-
dent to a requirements contract.
Buyer's actual requirements may be significantly less than either a
stated estimate or prior years' requirements, resulting in a disap-
pointed seller. The remaining sections examine buyer's obligations in
situations of reduced requirements.
B. Courts Employ Diverse Reasoning to Determine Whether Buyer
Reduced Its Requirements in Good Faith
1. Good Faith
To determine parties' rights and obligations after a decrease in
requirements, courts must decide whether buyer acted in good faith.
Good faith is the sole constraint on a requirements buyer whose actual
11. Id. at 611. There may be antitrust implications involved, depending on the market power
enjoyed by seller. For an early case recognizing this potential problem, see Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. & Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
12. Weistart, supra note 2, at 611.
13. Id.
874
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requirements are substantially less than either a stated estimate or nor-
mal prior requirements.14 The extent of the decrease does not deter-
mine the issue of good faith."5 Indeed, courts have found complete
cessation of requirements to be in good faith.16 If buyer acts in good
faith, and if the contract does not contain a minimum quantity term,
buyer may reduce its requirements-even to zero. 17
Good faith varies with the circumstances of each case.18 Courts
have adopted a variety of means to determine whether buyer reduced
its requirements in good faith. Buyer must have a reason for reduction
and may not scale down arbitrarily its requirements; something "more
than whim is required."19 It is uncertain how much more than whim
is required to justify buyer's reduction in requirements.20
Courts place the risk of good faith variation in buyer's requirements
on seller,2" reasoning that if seller wished to limit its risk, it' would
have bargained for a minimum requirements term.22 Seller does not,
however, assume the risk of bad faith variation in requirements. The
burden of proving bad faith is on the complaining seller.23 In cases of
decreased requirements, seller usually is unable to meet its burden.24
14. Although U.C.C. § 2-306(1) prohibits buyer from demanding a quantity unreasonably
disproportionate to either a stated estimate or normal prior requirements; courts and
commentators have determined that this clause applies to increases in requirements, but not to
decreases. Eg., Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir.
1988); R.A. Weaver & Assocs., Inc. v. Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Finch, Output and Requirements Contracts: The Scope of the Duty to Remain in Business,
14 U.C.C. L. 347, 351 (1982). This Comment accepts this determination.
15. Note, supra note 3, at 115.
16. E.g., Wilsonville Concrete Prods. v. Todd Bldg. Co., 281 Or. 345, 574 P.2d 1112 (1978);
see also Note, supra note 3, at 115.
17. See Weistart, supra note 2, at 634.
18. Note, supra note 3, at 113. The U.C.C. defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). In contracts between merchants, good
faith also includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." Id. § 2-103(l)(b). A merchant is, in essence, a buyer or seller who regularly deals in the
contract good. Id. § 2-104(1). Typically, a party involved in a requirements contract is a
merchant, because the contract form itself assumes an ongoing relationship. Weistart, supra note
2, at 622 n.49.
19. Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1340-41 (7th Cir. 1988).
20. Id at 1340.
21. R.A. Weaver & Assocs., Inc. v. Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
22. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Imperial Professional Coatings, 599 F. Supp. 436, 439
(E.D. Tenn. 1984); see also Note, Requirements Contracts: Problems of Drafting and
Construction, 78 HARV. L. Ray. 1212, 1220 (1965).
23. See Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1341.
24. Note, supra note 3, at 118.
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2. Courts' Application of U. CC. § 2-306(1)
In determining whether buyer reduced its requirements in good
faith, courts have focused on a variety of factors and employed signifi-
cantly different reasoning. While courts generally decide in favor of
buyer, different courts have emphasized variously buyer's business rea-
son, the degree of potential loss to buyer if it continues the contract,
and the absence of a minimum quantity term.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Empire Gas Corp. v. American
Bakeries Co.,25 one of the few to provide a remedy to a disappointed
seller, emphasized buyer's failure to provide a reason for the reduction
in requirements. Plaintiff seller distributed propane gas and convert-
ers that enable gasoline-powered motor vehicles to operate on pro-
pane. Defendant buyer operated a large fleet of vehicles and wanted to
convert its fleet to propane use. The parties agreed to a four-year
requirements contract containing an estimate of approximately 3,000
units.2 6 Within days after signing the contract, buyer repudiated.27
Although buyer had decided not to convert its fleet to propane, it gave
no reason for its change of heart.2 8 The court held that a reasonable
jury could not fail to find bad faith, because buyer had given no reason
for its refusal to order converters.29
In discussing when buyer may scale down its requirements, the
Empire Gas court focused on the potential degree of loss to buyer if it
continued the contract, stating that seller assumes the risk of a change
25. 840 F.2d at 1333 (Posner, J.).
26. Id. at 1335.
27. Buyer American Bakeries disputed this finding. Buyer contended that ten days after the
contract was signed, it notified seller that it was having budget problems and would delay making
purchases until it solved these problems. Brief for Appellant at 8, Empire Gas (No. 87-1411).
Seller Empire Gas admitted that buyer telephoned regarding budget problems and that buyer
said it did not have conversion money "available at that time." Brief for Appellee at 5, Empire
Gas (No. 87-1411). The trial court found that buyer notified seller of its budget problems, that
seller accepted this explanation, and that telephone contact between the parties regarding buyer's
budget problems and intent to perform the contract continued for over one year. Empire Gas
Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 646 F. Supp. 269, 270-71 (N.D. Il1. 1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 1333
(7th Cir. 1988). Buyer then notified seller it had no requirements. Id. at 271.
28. Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1335. But see supra note 27. The appellate court dismissed
buyer's budget problems as an unacceptable business reason for the lack of orders. "There is no
evidence in the record on why [buyer] changed its mind beyond vague references to 'budget
problems' that, so far as appears, may have been nothing more than a euphemism for a decision
by [buyer] not to allocate funds for conversion to propane." 840 F.2d at 1339.
29. Id. at 1341. The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that no reasonable jury
could fail to find bad faith on the part of buyer. Id. at 1343 (Kanne, J., dissenting). No evidence
on the issue of bad faith was offered at trial. The dissent concluded that "[t]he majority thus
transforms the seller's theoretical burden of proof on bad faith ... into an actual presumption of
the buyer's bad faith ...." Id.
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in buyer's business that makes continuation of the contract unduly
costly, but buyer assumes the risk of a less urgent change in circum-
stances.30 The court noted that how urgent the change in buyer's cir-
cumstances must be to justify a reduction in requirements is unclear,
but it is necessary for buyer to provide some reason for the change
other than pure whim.31
In three government contract disputes, courts reached the more
common result-though based on diverse reasoning-in deciding that
the buyers acted in good faith when they drastically reduced their
requirements. In R.A. Weaver & Associates v. Asphalt Construction,
Inc., 32 plaintiff seller contracted with defendant buyer to supply all the
crushed limestone required for a National Parks Service project for
which buyer was a subcontractor. The National Parks Service, pursu-
ant to changes and termination clauses in the contract with buyer's
prime contractor, deleted the provision calling for limestone. After
learning of the change, but before placing any orders, buyer notified
seller it had no requirements for limestone.33 The R.A. Weaver court
held that buyer had not breached the contract when it directed seller
not to send any limestone.34 The court never explicitly found that
buyer acted in good faith or that seller failed to prove bad faith. In
fact, the court failed to provide any reason for its decision.
In Wilsonville Concrete Products v. Todd Building Co.,35 the court
relied on three factors to decide in favor of buyer: Buyer's business
reason, the lack of a contract term specifying a minimum quantity
requirement, and buyer's lack of responsibility for termination of
requirements. Plaintiff seller contracted with defendant buyer to sup-
ply all the concrete buyer required for a government contract. Had
the contract been performed, buyer would have required approxi-
mately 3,058 cubic yards of concrete. 36 However, after seller had sup-
plied 245 cubic yards, the State of Oregon terminated its contract with
buyer. Buyer notified seller that it had no requirements.37 In holding
that buyer had not breached the contract, the Wilsonville court rea-
soned that once the project was terminated, buyer had no good faith
30. Id. at 1340. A less urgent change in circumstances might be a decision by buyer's
management that its capital would be more profitably employed in an alternative investment.
See id.
31. Id.
32. 587 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
33. Id. at 1316-17.
34. Id. at 1321.
35. 281 Or. 345, 574 P.2d 1112 (1978).
36. 574 P.2d at 1113.
37. Id. at 1115 n.1.
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requirements for concrete and was not obligated to buy any more con-
crete from seller.38 The court noted that it is not bad faith for buyer to
reduce its requirements for a business reason. 39 The court also noted
that the contract did not contain a minimum quantity term, seller did
not prove bad faith on the part of buyer, and buyer was not responsi-
ble for cancellation of the project.'
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Imperial Professional Coatings
("TVA'),41 the court decided for buyer and emphasized the absence of
a contract term specifying a minimum quantity requirement. Plaintiff
seller contracted with defendant buyer to supply protective coating
paint for proposed nuclear reactors. The parties signed a requirements
contract that specifically stated that buyer did not guarantee to
purchase any maximum or minimum amount.42 After seller had
shipped paint worth approximately $1.4 million, buyer deferred con-
struction on the reactors, determining that it had overestimated the
anticipated growth in demand for electricity.4 3 The TVA court stated
that the terms of the contract, specifically the absence of a minimum
quantity term, allocated the risk of cancellation of the contract to
seller. If seller intended a contrary result, the court reasoned, it could
have protected itself by bargaining for a minimum quantity term. 44
II. A BUSINESS REASON RULE SHOULD REPLACE
COURTS' RELIANCE ON INCONSISTENT
FACTORS TO DETERMINE GOOD FAITH
REDUCTIONS IN REQUIREMENTS
Parties to a requirements contract lack clear guidelines for their
rights and obligations because courts focus on several inconsistent fac-
tors in distinguishing good from bad faith reductions in requirements.
The U.C.C. provides, and courts agree, that parties must act in good
faith, but analysis of comments to the U.C.C. and cases applying sec-
tion 2-306(1) shows that good faith reductions remain ill-defined by
the Code and courts. A predictable rule would clearly delineate the
parties' rights and duties under a requirements contract. A "business
reason" rule, which defines good faith as buyer providing seller with a
38. Id. at 1115.
39. See id.
40. Id. at nn. 1-2.
41. 599 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
42. Id. at 438.
43. Id. at 437-38.
44. Id. at 439.
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business reason for a reduction, placing the risk of reduced require-
ments explicitly on seller, offers the desired predictability.
A. U. C.C. § 2-306(1), Comment 2 Provides No Practical Guidelines
to Requirements Contract Parties
The proliferation of various means of distinguishing good from bad
faith reductions in requirements may be due in part to the ambiguity
of section 2-306(1) and its comments. Courts have turned to section 2-
306(1), comment 2 ("comment 2") for guidance,45 because it purports
to provide practical guidelines for distinguishing good from bad faith.
The example in comment 2 distinguishes between a shutdown for lack
of orders which might be permissible and a shutdown to curtail losses
which would not. This distinction is not useful because it is unclear
how it should be applied in many cases.
Based on the distinction in comment 2, parties could predict a
court's ruling in only two situations: If buyer experienced no demand
for its final product, or if buyer had constant demand but chose to
reduce its orders to gain a larger profit. Assume buyer manufactures
denim jeans and seller manufactures buttons. At a time when all jeans
are made with buttons, buyer and seller enter into a long-term con-
tract for all of buyer's requirements for buttons. If there is a drastic
change in the consumer market and all consumers want jeans with
zippers, there will be no orders for jeans with buttons. Courts apply-
ing the example in comment 2 would find buyer justified in ordering
no buttons from seller. Parties could also predict the outcome if buyer
chooses to have no requirements in order to take advantage of the
opportunity to earn a higher profit. This might occur if demand for
buyer's jeans remains constant, but buyer decides to employ its pro-
duction resources in a more profitable product, denim tennis shoes.
Because there is no lack of orders, or even losses to curtail,4 6 courts
applying comment 2 would hold buyer liable to seller for breach of
contract.
Most cases are not as predictable as the extreme examples above
and defy application of comment 2. Suppose, instead of a drastic
change in the market for jeans, there is a gradual change of prefer-
ences to favor jeans with zippers. Comment 2 fails to provide a
45. The comments to the U.C.C. are not legislative history and have not been adopted as law
in the states. Courts have, however, considered the comments to be persuasive in interpreting the
text of the Code. Weistart, supra note 2, at 606 n.17; see also Empire Gas Corp. v. American
Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988).
46. Buyer experiences additional "opportunity costs"; the value of the opportunity given up.
For an economic analysis of this situation, see infra note 66.
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method for determining how insufficient the orders must be to justify a
reduction in requirements. If buyer's orders decrease by fifty percent,
but buyer can still cover its variable costs, 4 7 it is unclear whether this
is a sufficient lack of orders to justify buyer having no requirements for
buttons-even though buyer is not experiencing losses.
The result is equally unclear in situations where there is no lack of
orders, but there are significant losses to curtail. Suppose buyer
receives approximately the same number of orders for jeans as in prior
years, but production costs increase due to rising labor costs. If the
increase in production costs is significant, buyer could experience
losses certain to put it out of business. In this case, buyer's refusal to
require buttons will not be due to lack of orders, but to losses it wishes
to curtail. The example in comment 2 implies that buyer ought to be
held to the contract at the expense of its business.
The hardship is comparable between a buyer who is lacking orders
and a buyer who is experiencing losses fairly certain to put it out of
business. In both situations, buyer's business may be threatened. A
buyer is not likely to bargain away its right to exercise its best business
judgment.48 Thus, not only is it often difficult to determine how the
suggested distinction in comment 2 would apply to a set of facts, but
the difference in results could be unjustified.
B. The Business Reason Rule
A predictable rule governing requirements contracts would place
the risk of good faith reductions in requirements explicitly on seller,
unless the parties bargain for another allocation. It would define good
faith as buyer providing seller with a business reason for a reduction.
"Business reason" means an economic reason, such as business losses
or a more profitable alternative investment. 49 The very nature of
requirements contracts suggests an ongoing relationship between
buyer and seller where communication is important. Requiring buyer
to provide a business reason for a reduction would fulfill buyer's duty
47. Variable costs fluctuate with the amount of a producer's output and include the costs of
inputs. Fixed costs remain constant regardless of the amount of a producer's output and are
often referred to as "overhead." If a producer cannot cover its variable costs, it makes no profit
and will cease production even though it can still cover its fixed costs. See W. BAUMOL & A.
BLINDER, ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND POLICY MICROECONOMICS 115-47 (4th ed. 1988).
48. Weistart, supra note 2, at 629.
49. Business reason would not include, for example, a sudden dislike for seller or a change in
management.
880
Vol. 64:871, 1989
Requirements Contracts
of fair dealing and might dispel seller's fear that buyer will act arbi-
trarily. Seller would retain the option of proving buyer acted in bad
faith, that is, dishonestly.
The business reason rule's advantages are numerous. First, parties
to a requirements contract would know their rights and obligations.
For buyer to reduce its requirements, assuming the parties did not
reallocate the risk of a reduction, buyer must provide seller with a
business reason for the change. Second, the rule would enhance the
advantages a requirements contract has over a fixed quantity contract.
It would maintain the business and production flexibility so important
to buyer, and provide seller with some security in knowing that buyer
will not decrease its orders unless there is a business reason to do so.
Third, the rule would not require courts to draw fine, often
unfounded, distinctions between curtailing losses and lacking orders,
or between changes in circumstances that make continuation of the
contract unduly costly and changes that are less urgent. Instead,
courts need only determine whether the parties contracted for a reallo-
cation of the risk of reduced requirements, and, if not, whether buyer
gave seller a business reason for the reduction. Fourth, because seller
may prove buyer acted dishonestly or contrary to notions of fair deal-
ing in the given industry, the rule comports with the definition of good
faith adopted by the drafters of the U.C.C.. Fifth, the rule preserves
seller's judicially-imposed burden of proving bad faith. With the
proliferation of vague rationales to determine if buyer acted in good
faith, courts may easily, perhaps unknowingly, shift this burden.5"
Finally, the rule is compatible with the idea of flexible quantity con-
tracts. The requirements buyer agrees only to buy its actual good faith
requirements from seller. Buyer does not agree to buy an amount
equaling or approximating the stated estimate. If seller wants more
protection, it is free to bargain for a minimum requirements term.5"
C. Applying the Business Reason Rule
The business reason rule would permit courts to replace their incon-
sistent.and often vague approaches to reduced requirements cases with
50. See supra note 29.
51. Adoption of the business reason rule may lead to fewer requirements contracts. Some
sellers may refuse to assume the risk of a reduction in requirements when buyers' obligation is
merely to provide a business reason for the reduction. This result would not necessarily be
undesirable. It is preferable for sellers to bargain for contracts that express their true intent*
rather than to bargain for a requirements contract with the expectation that it will be treated like
a fixed quantity contract.
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more consistent and reasoned analysis. Analysis of each case previ-
ously discussed in light of the proposed rule shows that a decision
based on the rule would allow parties to requirements contracts to
predict their rights and responsibilities if reduced requirements occur.
The distinction between good and bad faith reductions in require-
ments that the Seventh Circuit adopted in Empire Gas52 is of no more
practical use than that set forth in comment 2. The court stated that
seller assumes the risk of changes in buyer's circumstances that make
continuation of the contract unduly costly, but does not assume the
risk of less urgent changes. It is unclear when a change in circum-
stances makes performance of the contract unduly costly and when a
change is less urgent. The court offered no guidelines other than that
something more than whim is required. Like the example in comment
2, this distinction leaves an expansive middle ground where a court's
application of the distinction would be wholly unpredictable.53
If the Empire Gas court had applied the business reason rule, it
would have decided in favor of buyer. First, after examining the con-
tract, the court would have found that the parties did not allocate the
risk of reduced requirements to buyer.54 Second, buyer did provide
seller with a business reason for its lack of requirements: budget
problems.55 Although the court dismissed budget problems as an
inadequate business reason, they would suffice under the suggested
rule. An investigation into the type or degree of potential loss to buyer
if it continues the contract is inappropriate. Had buyer wished to bind
itself to purchase approximately the stated estimate, absent extreme
business losses, it would have bargained for a fixed quantity contract
and relied on such doctrines as impossibility, impracticability, and
frustration of purpose for relief from performance. 6 Finally, seller in
Empire Gas did not prove bad faith on the part of buyer.
52. 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra text
accompanying notes 25-31.
53. Indeed, such unpredictability is manifest in the court's refusal to accept the trial court's
finding that budget problems, surely something more than whim, were shown. See supra notes
27-28.
54. See 840 F.2d at 1335.
55. See supra note 27.
56. "Impossibility" applies when performance of the contract is physically impossible.
Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85 (1977). "Impracticability" applies when performance would
entail a much higher cost than originally anticipated. Id. at 86. "Frustration of purpose" applies
when performance is possible, but the underlying purpose of the contract is no longer attainable.
Id. at 85.
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Use of the business reason rule in R.A. Weaver 57 and Wilsonville58
would not have altered the results, but would have permitted more
reasoned analyses. In R.A. Weaver, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia found good faith in buyer's complete elimination of
limestone requirements. The court failed to state its reasoning, mov-
ing from a statement that the law requires good faith and does not
prohibit good faith reductions in requirements, to the conclusion that
buyer did not breach the contract. Although the court did not explic-
itly find that buyer acted in good faith, this conclusion is implicit in
the holding. The absence of a stated reason behind the court's decision
leaves contracting parties in the District of Columbia Circuit without
a clear guide to their obligations under requirements contracts.
The Oregon Supreme Court's analysis in Wilsonville is ambiguous.
The court appeared to rely on several factors when deciding whether
buyer acted in good faith, but did not explicitly include any of the
factors in its analysis. Two of the factors, the absence of a contract
term specifying a minimum quantity of concrete and buyer's lack of
responsibility for the government contract termination, the court men-
tioned only in footnotes. The third factor, buyer's business reason,
appeared in a quotation without explanation of its importance.59
After Wilsonville, Oregon parties to requirements contracts can only
speculate about which of the three factors actually influenced the
court's decision.
Applying the business reason rule to both R.A. Weaver and Wil-
sonville would provide contracting parties with definite guidelines. In
both cases, buyers acted in good faith. Both buyers notified the sellers
of the reduced requirements upon learning of the change. Both buyers
gave a business reason for the reduction: the change in, or cancellation
of, a government contract. In addition, neither buyer was responsible
for the reduction, and neither seller proved bad faith. The courts'
ambiguous analyses could have been avoided by simply stating that
buyers acted in good faith by providing sellers with a business reason
for reducing their orders.
57. 587 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra text
accompanying notes 32-34.
58. 281 Or. 345, 574 P.2d 1112 (1978). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra text
accompanying notes 35-40.
59. "'Thus, it is not bad faith for a buyer to reduce his orders where his own business needs
have actually fallen off'.... 574 P.2d at 1115 (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-8, at 108-09 (1972)).
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The TVA 60 court's conclusion is compatible with the rule suggested
here. As in R.A. Weaver, the TVA court stated that buyer reduced its
requirements in good faith, but the court did not give any reason for
finding good faith.6 In fact, because buyer's reduced requirements for
protective coating paint was the result of its own mistaken projection
of future energy needs, a finding of good faith is less obvious than in
cases like R.A. Weaver and Wilsonville where the reduction was not
the fault of buyer, but due to a third party's actions. The TVA court
did not rely on buyer's good faith in reaching its decision, but rather
on the notion that if seller had wanted more protection, it could have
bargained for a minimum quantity term.62
Application of the business reason rule produces the same result in
TVA, yet allows for a more complete and reasoned analysis. First,
when buyer determined that it had overestimated the demand for elec-
tricity, it had a business reason for deferring construction of the reac-
tors. If the energy was not needed, buyer would experience losses if it
built the plants at that time. Second, buyer notified seller and
explained the reason for its decision. Finally, as the TVA court
pointed out, seller could have bargained for a minimum requirements
term if it wanted to alleviate the risk of good faith reductions in
requirements.
III. COURTS' DIVERSE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
GOOD FAITH OBLIGATION RESULT IN
ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY
The proposed business reason rule would not only enable parties to
requirements contracts to predict their rights and obligations, but also
would promote efficient exchanges between these parties. 63 Courts
and legislatures should adopt rules that most contracting parties
60. 599 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra
text accompanying notes 41-44.
61. Seller conceded that buyer acted in good faith in deferring production of the reactors. 599
F. Supp. at 438. The court did not discuss why seller conceded this issue.
62. Id. at 439.
63. Whether the rule is "fair" or "just" is considered separately from the economic analysis.
See infra Part IV. The sole goal of this part of the Comment is to provide a positive economic
analysis. A positive economic analysis considers the actual outcomes of a given rule as it exists,
rather than whether a given rule based on efficiency is a "good" rule. See Posner & Rosenfield,
supra note 56, at 89.
A given rule is efficient if it is "welfare-maximizing." That is, the rule is efficient if those who
gain from it gain enough so they could compensate those who lose. This is referred to as
"Kaldor-Hicks efficiency." Harrison, A Case For Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 573 n.3
(1983). Another type of efficiency is "Pareto Optimality," which defines an efficient exchange as
one which makes at least one party better off without making another party worse off. E.
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would bargain for and adopt themselves; this will promote economi-
cally efficient exchanges by decreasing the costs of contracting and
freeing up resources for more productive uses. Perpetuating an
unpopular rule will increase contracting costs, because economic anal-
ysis shows that parties will bargain around such a rule.
A. The Coase Theorem and Transaction Costs
A discussion of the desirability of a particular contract rule is
incomplete without a discussion of the rule's efficiency. Commentators
have begun to recognize economic efficiency as an important aspect of
contract law." A primary function of contract law is to facilitate
exchange.65 One way to facilitate exchange is to make it less costly. A
rule that is predictable and generally preferred by contracting parties
will make exchange less costly, because most parties will not expend
resources bargaining for an alternate rule. Such a rule is economically
efficient.
The Coase Theorem, the foundation of many "law and economics"
discussions, demonstrates that parties will bargain around inefficient
rules. The Coase Theorem provides that, given zero transaction costs,
the law's assignments of rights and liabilities will not affect the alloca-
tion of resources.6 6 Applied to requirements contracts, the Coase The-
orem shows that, absent transaction costs, which party bears the risk
of reduced requirements has no effect on whether parties decide to
contract, because parties will bargain around an inefficient allocation
of risk.
BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 149-50 (3d ed.
1989).
64. For various articles applying economic concepts to legal rules, see JOURNAL OF LAW &
ECONOMICS and JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES.
65. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44-45 (1972).
66. R. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 106 (1988). The example often
used to illustrate the Coase Theorem involves a rancher whose cattle strayed and destroyed the
crops of a neighboring farmer. Whether or not the rancher is liable to the farmer for the damage
caused by her straying cattle will not affect whether she continues to raise cattle. If the rancher
were liable to the farmer, she would include these potential liability costs when calculating
whether cattle ranching is profitable. But if the rancher were not liable to the farmer for the
damage, the farmer would be willing to pay her a sum of money up to the amount of the damage
to restrain her cattle. The rancher would consider this payment from the farmer when
computing the costs of her cattle operation, because when her cattle strayed she would have to
forgo the payment. This forgone money represents an "opportunity cost," an alternative the
rancher must give up to pursue her activity. In both situations, therefore, the rancher will take
the damage cost into account. Regardless of where the liability rests, if her profit from ranching
exceeds her costs, either in the form of money paid to the farmer or money forgone, she will
continue her operations.
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Transaction costs do exist and can be so high that they preclude
exchanges that would have occurred in the absence of such costs.6 7
Transaction costs in a contracts setting include the costs of locating
another party, determining one's legal rights, and negotiating a con-
tract. The costs of negotiating a contract decrease if parties reduce the
number of contract terms for which they must bargain. The U.C.C.
and other substantive contract laws provide default terms that become
part of each contract unless parties specifically bargain for other
terms.6 8 If parties are satisfied with the default term, they do not need
to devote resources to negotiating a specific term for their contract. If
parties are unsatisfied with the default term, they may negotiate
around it.
69
According to the Coase Theorem, if this rearrangement of rights
were without transaction costs, it would always take place if it would
lead to a greater value of production.70 But such transactions are
costly,7' and parties negotiate around a term only if the increase in the
value of production that will result from the rearrangement of rights
exceeds the costs of those negotiations.72
B. The Business Reason Rule Is Economically Efficient
Economic analysis shows that the business reason rule is desirable
because it would be more efficient for the contracting parties, would
preserve court resources, and would further the advantages of require-
ments contracts. Existing rules are unclear. Although section 2-
306(1) allows buyer to reduce its requirements in good faith, it does
not indicate when a reduction is in good faith, and the example in
comment 2 is without economic merit. 73 In addition, courts' interpre-
tations of section 2-306(1) result in inefficient bargains; parties need a
clear, predictable rule to avoid expending resources bargaining for a
more explicit allocation of the risk of reduced requirements.
67. R. COASE, supra note 66, at 114.
68. U.C.C. Article 2 on Sales contains default rules governing various contract terms such as
price, id. § 2-305, place for delivery, id. § 2-308, and time of performance, id. § 2-309.
69. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4, 6 (1979).
70. "Production" in this context means the value of output from the exchange.
71. In the case of requirements contracts, it is especially costly to bargain for a term
allocating the risk of reductions in requirements. Quantity is dependent on a relatively
unpredictable factor, buyer's future requirements, and it is impossible to foresee all events that
may occur and affect the desirability of the contract. See R. COASE, supra note 66, at 119.
72. See id. at 114-15.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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The following economic analysis is based on several simplifying
assulmptions. First, the contracting parties do business in a competi-
tive market;74 second, all parties to requirements contracts are profit-
maximizing and, therefore, prefer contract terms that will maximize
the value of the exchange;75 third, the legal rights of the parties are
well defined; fourth, parties are aware of the legal rules that govern
their contractual relationship; and fifth, the distribution of wealth is
given and held constant.76
The U.C.C.'s example of the application of the good faith standard,
set forth in comment 2, ignores the concept of opportunity costs and is
a distinction without an economic difference. Comment 2 suggests
that a shutdown due to a lack of orders is probably within the confines
of good faith, whereas a shutdown to curtail losses probably is not.
Analysis of two hypothetical situations shows that the economic result
is the same in each case.77 Comment 2 suggests that in the first situa-
tion, where buyer experiences a total lack of orders, buyer could in
good faith reduce its requirements, even to zero. However, in the sec-
ond situation, where buyer has orders but could net a larger profit in
an alternative enterprise, a reduction in orders would not be permitted
because there is no lack of orders and no loss to curtail. Economic
analysis reveals, however, that buyer may experience losses if it per-
forms the contract, because it will incur the opportunity-costs of forgo-
ing a higher profit from an alternative use of its resources. Whether
buyer will experience an out-of-pocket loss of, say, $50 in the first situ-
ation or an additional opportunity cost of $50 in the second situation,
buyer will consider the $50 a cost of business. 78 Both cases decrease
the value of the exchange. Each situation makes the transaction
equally disadvantageous. The distinction in comment 2 is not eco-
nomically justified; courts should disregard it.
The ambiguous allocation of the risk of reduced requirements under
the present interpretation of good faith renders the rule inefficient
because parties will expend resources bargaining for a more explicit
allocation.79 Courts' interpretations of the obligation of good faith are
74. In a competitive market, price is determined by the interaction between supply of a given
product and demand for that product.
75. The more efficient the exchange, the larger the potential profit from the contract which
will be divided between the parties. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 56, at 89.
76. A set distribution of wealth is necessary to the concept of opportunity costs. If parties are
assumed to have only a given amount of resources, they must choose between various alternative
investments. See supra note 66 for a discussion of opportunity costs.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48 (discussion of hypothetical situations).
78. See supra note 66 regarding the effect of opportunity costs on the value of an exchange.
79. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 56, at 96.
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so unpredictable that parties will not know their legal rights.80
Although courts generally decide in favor of buyers, requirements con-
tract parties cannot know which reasons will justify a reduction in
requirements. As a result of this uncertainty, there will be a tendency
for all requirements contracts parties to bargain for a more predict-
able, explicit allocation, increasing the cost of contracting. As the cost
of contracting increases, the value of the contract declines.
Economic analysis shows that the business reason rule is preferable
for several reasons. First, it is efficient for the contracting parties. The
bargaining process would be less difficult and less costly because the
parties' rights and obligations would be clearly defined. Instead of all
parties expending resources to clarify their rights in the face of a vague
rule, only those parties opting to reallocate the risk of reductions in
requirements would negotiate this term. Second, the proposed rule
would preserve court resources. Instead of devising ad hoc methods to
determine when reductions are in good faith, courts, when faced with
the issue of reduced requirements, need only determine if the parties
reallocated the risk away from seller and, if not, whether buyer gave a
business reason for the reduction. Finally, the business reason rule
furthers the advantages of open quantity contracts. Specifically, the
rule provides buyer with the desired flexibility which likely led buyer
to choose a requirements contract while guaranteeing seller a market
free of competitors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The business reason rule could alleviate the present problems of
legal uncertainty and exchange inefficiency, which result from courts'
varying interpretations of U.C.C. § 2-306(1) when buyer has reduced
requirements. The rule would require buyer to give seller a business
reason for a reduction in requirements. It would place the risk of
reductions explicitly on seller, but allow parties to bargain for an alter-
native allocation. This rule would foster more efficient exchanges,
provide legal predictability, preserve court resources, and further
advantages inherent in requirements contracts.
Although the previous legal and economic analyses did not consider
whether the proposed rule was "fair" or "just," these concepts will not
be compromised by the proposed rule. Fairness and equality are not
synonymous. A party should not be prohibited from, or penalized for,
capitalizing on superior bargaining power, especially when both par-
ties are merchants bargaining at arms length. "The principle is one of
80. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48 (comment 2 applied to hypothetical situations).
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prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."81 Under
the proposed rule, seller remains free to prove buyer acted in bad faith,
that is, dishonestly or contrary to notions of fair dealing in the trade.
In addition, contract law provides remedies for specific abuses of the
right to contract. U.C.C. § 2-302 polices contracts, or clauses in con-
tracts, that are unconscionable. If a contract is procedurally or sub-
stantively unconscionable, or if it violates public policy, a court may
refuse to enforce it. Parties also are protected by contract laws gov-
erning duress, fraud, and misrepresentation.8 2
If the bargaining process was fair and the contract is substantively
fair, fairness in performance of the requirements contract requires no
more than buyer providing seller with a business reason for a reduc-
tion. If seller seeks security, rather than simply fairness, seller should
bargain for either a term specifying a minimum quantity or for a fixed
quantity contract.
Requirements contracts offer parties a unique flexibility not found
in fixed quantity contracts, and legal rules should facilitate the negoti-
ation of such contracts. U.C.C. § 2-306(1), as inconsistently inter-
preted by courts, either discourages parties from choosing a
requirements contract or forces parties to expend resources bargaining
for explicit contract terms, increasing the cost of contracting. The
business reason rule would remove the legal and economic barriers to
requirements contracts by providing the predictability contracting
parties desire.
Cheryl R. Guttenberg
81. U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (emphasis added).
82. -g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 159-164, 174-175 (1979).
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